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March 13, 2015 Comments (37) Views: 57253 Security

UK traffic diverted through Ukraine

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On the heels of the BGP leak yesterday that briefly impaired Google services around the world, comes another routing incident that impacted some other important Internet services.

Beginning on Saturday, Ukrainian telecom provider, Vega, began announcing 14 British Telecom (BT) routes, resulting in the redirection of Internet traffic through Ukraine for a handful of British Telecom customers.  Early yesterday morning, Vega announced another 167 BT prefixes for 1.5 hours resulting in the rerouting of additional traffic destined for some of BT’s customers, including the UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment, the “organization responsible for the design, manufacture and support of warheads for the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent.”


v5
Background

In early 2013, Ukrainian provider Vega (AS12883) became a reseller of BT services, but prior to Saturday had never announced any BT routes.  Then, in the middle of a weekend night in Europe (02:37 UTC on Saturday, March 7th), Vega began announcing 14 prefixes typically announced by AS2856 of BT.  These prefixes are listed below.

109.234.168.0/21 Thales Transport and Security Ltd (Barnet, GB)
109.234.169.0/24 Thales Transport and Security Ltd (Ealing, GB)
144.87.142.0/24  Royal Mail Group Limited (Sheffield, GB)
144.87.143.0/24  Royal Mail Group Limited (Chesterfield, GB)
147.182.214.0/24 Black & Veatch (Manchester, GB)
193.113.245.0/24 BT - 21CN (GB)
193.221.55.0/24  Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget SCA  (GB)
193.32.23.0/24   Tilbury Container Services Ltd  (Tilbury, GB)
193.36.243.0/24  Allen and Overy LLP     Tower (Hamlets, GB)
193.39.16.0/21   The Guinness Partnership (Oldham, GB)
194.34.64.0/24   AstraZeneca PLC (GB)
195.171.26.0/24  The Carphone Warehouse Limited (Westminster, GB)
195.211.94.0/24  AEA Technology Plc (Islington, GB)
203.215.136.0/24 Servcorp SmartOffice (Tower Hamlets, GB)

redirect_your_mail

The Royal Mail group is the postal service company of the UK.  While the Royal Mail’s website offers a handy “Redirect your mail” link, it was their electronic mail that was being redirected over the past week, because one of the impacted networks contains the IP addresses of their email servers, which are shown next.

$ dig +short royalmail.com MX
10 cscmaanot02.royalmail.com.
10 cscmaanot01.royalmail.com.
$ dig +short cscmaanot02.royalmail.com. A
144.87.143.99
$ dig +short cscmaanot01.royalmail.com. A
144.87.143.97

The following graphics display the percentage of our peers over time that saw either BT (AS2856) or Vega (AS12883) announce routes for the Royal Mail service.  Both of these routes are covered by 144.87.128.0/17, which is announced by British Telecom (AS2856). So for about five days, a significant portion of the Internet was sending traffic destined for these routes to Vega in the Ukraine. Our traceroutes show that traffic continued on to British Telecom after passing through Kiev.

144.87.143.0_24_1425686400_1426186800 144.87.142.0_24_1425686400_1426186800

Hijacked Nuke Networks

Atomic_Weapons_Establishment_(logo)

Then at 03:03 UTC yesterday morning, Vega (AS12883) began announcing 167 additional BT prefixes, including the following prefixes of the UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment.  After routing all of these prefixes for 90+ minutes, Vega stopped announcing any BT prefixes at 04:36 UTC.

132.153.244.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.245.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.246.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.247.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.248.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.249.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.250.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.251.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.252.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.253.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.254.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment GB
132.153.3.0/24   Atomic Weapons Establishment GB

Next, we illustrate the route propagation profiles for two of the aforementioned AWE prefixes.  Since these routes were already globally distributed by BT, only a small portion of the Internet believed that Vega was a better alternative.   (Another noteworthy network impacted at the same time was that of defense contractor Lockheed Martin, apparently hosting an external VPN service at evpnuk1a.external.lmco.com, which resolves to 192.28.124.20.)

132.153.244.0_24_1426125600_1426140000 132.153.244.0_24_1426125600_1426140000

The above Atomic Weapons Establishment address space contains the IP addresses of their email servers, namely:

132.153.244.3 awe.co.uk mta1.awe.co.uk
132.153.244.4 awe.co.uk mta2.awe.co.uk

To illustrate this traffic redirection, we will consider the normal and altered traceroute paths from one location in the US to AWE.  On the day prior, the traceroute shown below goes from Houston via Softlayer to the Telehouse facility in New York City, and then onto BT and AWE.

trace from Houston, TX to Atomic Weapons Establishment at 12:40 Mar 11, 2015
1  *
2  173.193.118.140 ae12.dar02.sr02.hou02.networklayer.com      0.28
3  50.97.18.242    ae9.bbr01.sr02.hou02.networklayer.com       0.28
4  173.192.18.218  ae3.bbr01.eq01.dal03.networklayer.com       6.13
5  173.192.18.137  ae0.bbr01.eq01.chi01.networklayer.com      26.17
6  173.192.18.133  ae0.bbr02.tl01.nyc01.networklayer.com      48.188
7  173.192.18.176  ae7.bbr01.tl01.nyc01.networklayer.com      51.295
8  198.32.160.80   (TELEHOUSE, New York)                      46.511
9  166.49.208.40   t2c3-xe-11-3-1-0.uk-lon1.eu.bt.net        114.113
10 166.49.211.243  166-49-211-243.eu.bt.net                  114.354
11 213.121.193.151 host213-121-193-151.ukcore.bt.net         114.142
12 62.172.103.85   core2-pos1-0.birmingham.ukcore.bt.net     239.692
13 62.6.196.74     vhsaccess1-pos8-0.birmingham.fixed.bt.net 121.198
14 132.153.3.254   Atomic Weapons Establishment              134.476

During the hijack on the next day, a traceroute from the same location gets diverted to Vega’s interface at DECIX in Frankfurt, Germany (Ucomline is Vega’s international brand).  From there, it was passed to Vega’s interface with its Russian transit provider, RETN, before traveling back to the London Internet Exchange and finally to its intended destination at AWE via BT.

trace from Houston, TX to Atomic Weapons Establishment at 03:22 Mar 12, 2015
1  *
2  173.193.118.140 ae12.dar02.sr02.hou02.networklayer.com      2.948
3  50.97.18.246    ae9.bbr02.sr02.hou02.networklayer.com         0.3
4  173.192.18.220  ae3.bbr02.eq01.dal03.networklayer.com       8.133
5  173.192.18.135  ae1.bbr01.tl01.atl01.networklayer.com      28.524
6  173.192.18.152  ae0.bbr01.eq01.wdc02.networklayer.com      42.033
7  173.192.18.195  ae7.bbr02.eq01.wdc02.networklayer.com      40.167
8  50.97.18.215    ae0.bbr01.eq01.ams02.networklayer.com     118.838
9  50.97.18.217    ae0.bbr02.xn01.fra01.networklayer.com     124.983
10 50.97.18.218    ae7.bbr01.xn01.fra01.networklayer.com     124.133
11 80.81.194.177   edge-3-2-5-231.kiev.ucomline.net          154.988
12 87.245.247.157  ae2-241.RT.NTL.KIV.UA.retn.net            155.174
13 87.245.233.238  ae2-10.RT.TC2.LON.UK.retn.net             158.221
14 195.66.224.10   linx1.ukcore.bt.net                       161.442
15 194.72.31.130   (BTnet inter-pop routes, GB)              166.986
16 62.172.103.89   core1-pos1-1.birmingham.ukcore.bt.net     163.205
17 62.6.196.70     vhsaccess1-pos7-0.birmingham.fixed.bt.net 164.139
18 132.153.3.254   (Atomic Weapons Establishment, GB)        177.4

The 167 hijacked prefixes (listed below) also included more innocuous networks like those of Pepsi Cola (165.197.56.0/22) and Wal-Mart UK (161.163.166.0/24 and 161.163.177.0/24).  However, these networks do host domains with “VPN” and “mail” in their names, implying they provide important services for these companies.  Does this list represent some curious mistake or something more?  Either way, it redirected a portion of Internet traffic bound for networks, at a minimum resulting in poor performance for some customers.

161.163.166.101 csukvpn01.wal-mart.com
161.163.166.101 uksslvpngw.wal-mart.com
161.163.166.102 csukvpn02.wal-mart.com
165.197.57.5    emea.webmail.intl.pepsico.com
165.197.57.6    emea.webmail.intl.pepsico.com

165.197.56.0_22_1426125600_1426140000 161.163.166.0_24_1426125600_1426140000

Conclusion

Unlike yesterday’s Google routing leak that was remediated after only 20 minutes, Vega’s errant announcement of BT’s networks went on for five days.  As we’ve chronicled in the blog in past, route hijacking has become a growing and ever-present concern.  As a result, enterprises must monitor their routes to ensure uninterrupted Internet connectivity for their customers — no one else is going to do it for them.  Whether for security or performance, tools like Dyn Internet Intelligence were built to address this need.

Below is a complete listing of the 167 leaked prefixes from yesterday:

212.162.232.0/24 Cofunds Ltd (GB)
148.253.220.0/23 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (GB)
61.28.211.0/24 Servcorp (GB)
86.128.0.0/11 BT Infrastructure Layer (GB)
86.128.0.0/12 BT Infrastructure Layer (GB)
193.32.254.0/24 Marks and Spencer PLC (GB)
194.70.94.0/24 Dabs Direct PLC (GB)
148.252.5.0/24 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (GB)
37.235.123.0/24 Submission Technology Ltd (GB)
194.169.34.0/24 AgustaWestland Ltd (GB)
81.128.0.0/12 BT Infrastructure Layer (GB)
143.159.0.0/16 INFONET Services Corporation (GB)
147.148.0.0/14 Various Registries (Maintained by ARIN) (GB)
193.46.221.0/24 Continental DataGraphics Ltd (GB)
132.153.3.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
194.169.69.0/24 BUILDING DESIGN PARTNERSHIP LIMITED (GB)
91.230.16.0/24 Dairy Crest Ltd (GB)
193.32.48.0/24 Virgin Money plc (GB)
193.36.240.0/24 Allen and Overy LLP (GB)
192.19.187.0/24 Avago Technologies U.S. Inc. (GB)
31.48.0.0/13 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
195.171.0.0/16 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
132.153.254.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
213.120.0.0/14 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
91.223.126.0/24 Evolving Systems Limited (GB)
116.66.140.0/22 Cognizant Technology Solution India Pvt Ltd, India (GB)
81.128.0.0/11 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
195.182.62.0/24 The Football Association Ltd (GB)
185.30.8.0/22 Satellite Applications Catapult Limited (GB)
86.128.0.0/10 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
147.152.0.0/16 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
162.62.136.0/22 Adaptec, Inc. (GB)
193.28.232.0/24 TEVA UK HOLDINGS LIMITED (GB)
193.238.232.0/24 Pinewood Technologies Plc (GB)
194.36.55.0/24 Hogg Robinson PLC (GB)
196.4.50.0/24 Uniserv Group (GB)
194.33.160.0/24 Office of Communications (GB)
161.163.177.0/24 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (GB)
194.130.197.0/24 MAID PLC (GB)
192.65.44.0/24 Tektronix, Inc. (GB)
192.189.160.0/24 Lafarge Tarmac Holdings Limited (GB)
132.153.252.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
193.195.138.0/24 Telme Online Limited (GB)
193.33.244.0/24 AAH Pharmaceuticals Ltd (GB)
132.153.251.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
198.200.211.0/24 Curtis Instruments, Inc. (GB)
193.46.76.0/24 Shire Pharmaceuticals Limited (GB)
144.98.0.0/16 RWE NPower (GB)
84.23.0.0/19 Biznet IIS Ltd. (GB)
158.234.0.0/16 CGI IT UK Ltd. (GB)
193.35.197.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
194.60.136.0/24 Cornwall Council (GB)
146.174.170.0/23 Quantum Corporation (GB)
167.26.157.0/24 CIBC World Markets (GB)
109.205.158.0/24 BONTBLOCK (GB)
5.81.0.0/16 BT Infrastructure Layer (GB)
162.10.0.0/19 Doculynx Inc. (GB)
158.155.253.0/24 Computer Generation (GB)
165.197.56.0/22 Pepsi-Cola International (GB)
193.37.142.0/24 CSC IT Ltd (GB)
148.252.3.0/24 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (GB)
193.113.0.0/16 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
194.36.248.0/24 WWRD United Kingdom Ltd (GB)
193.37.160.0/24 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
91.198.255.0/24 Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council (GB)
192.65.227.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
5.53.64.0/19 SAS Global Communications Ltd. (GB)
132.153.244.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
170.136.115.0/24 Viad Corp (GB)
194.59.188.0/24 WCMC 2000 (GB)
194.132.25.0/24 WSP Europe (GB)
195.99.0.0/16 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
192.152.14.0/24 Aircraft Research Association Limited (GB)
159.10.208.0/22 CNA Insurance (GB)
199.181.156.0/24 ARC - Chicago (GB)
132.153.246.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
192.65.224.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
94.72.248.0/21 KCOM BT sub-allocation (GB)
193.238.233.0/24 Pinewood Technologies Plc (GB)
193.219.122.0/24 Significant (UK) Ltd (GB)
80.247.56.0/23 PGDS UK ONE - BT Internet - PG1 DC (GB)
192.65.228.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
192.65.226.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
194.169.32.0/24 AgustaWestland Ltd (GB)
204.124.211.0/24 Fruit of the Loom, Inc. (GB)
194.169.32.0/20 AgustaWestland Ltd (GB)
148.253.4.0/22 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (GB)
194.132.24.0/24 WSP Europe (GB)
194.169.22.0/24 Isoft Health Ltd (GB)
132.153.247.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
194.34.174.0/24 Allianz Insurance plc (GB)
161.163.166.0/24 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (GB)
195.8.202.0/23 Significant (UK) Ltd (GB)
192.31.31.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
192.28.124.0/24 Lockheed Martin Corporation (GB)
212.140.0.0/16 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
193.195.7.0/24 Thus PLC t/a Demon Internet (GB)
192.19.199.0/24 Avago Technologies U.S. Inc. (GB)
91.233.33.0/24 Metropolitan Networks UK Ltd (GB)
192.65.222.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
159.180.96.0/19 BT-CENTRAL-PLUS (GB)
165.120.0.0/16 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
155.202.124.0/22 SANTANDER UK PLC (GB)
150.147.68.0/24 Data Research Associates, Inc. (GB)
132.146.0.0/16 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
109.144.0.0/12 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
159.253.66.0/23 KCOM Group Public Limited Company (GB)
142.205.161.0/24 Toronto Dominion Bank (GB)
62.7.0.0/16 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
62.239.0.0/16 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
194.36.128.0/24 Hitachi Europe Ltd (GB)
194.32.3.0/24 Northern Ireland Civil Service (GB)
170.136.116.0/24 Viad Corp (GB)
217.32.0.0/12 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
192.65.219.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
194.169.33.0/24 AgustaWestland Ltd (GB)
213.1.0.0/16 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
62.6.0.0/16 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
5.80.0.0/15 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
195.244.16.0/24 Websense SC Operations Limited (GB)
91.227.78.0/24 Ashridge (Bonar Law Memorial) Trust (GB)
194.169.36.0/24 AgustaWestland Ltd (GB)
193.131.115.0/24 Eurodollar (UK) Limited (GB)
192.65.223.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
212.70.68.0/23 Intuitiv Ltd. (GB)
194.169.79.0/24 BUILDING DESIGN PARTNERSHIP LIMITED (GB)
132.153.250.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
80.247.0.0/20 Net Energy Internet Ltd. (GB)
195.35.123.0/24 Toshiba Information Systems (UK) Ltd (GB)
194.130.196.0/24 MAID PLC (GB)
194.34.211.0/24 The Statistics Board (GB)
85.235.107.0/24 DMZ at Bacton. (GB)
146.198.0.0/16 INFONET Services Corporation (GB)
82.132.188.0/22 O2 Reference (UK) (GB)
194.72.0.0/14 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
213.249.188.0/22 KCOM Group Public Limited Company (GB)
194.34.210.0/24 The Statistics Board (GB)
194.34.205.0/24 The Statistics Board (GB)
192.65.225.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
132.153.245.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
132.153.253.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
132.153.249.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
162.116.126.0/24 Allergan, Inc. (GB)
91.247.73.0/24 Unipath Limited (GB)
145.229.0.0/16 Northern Ireland Civil Service (GB)
192.65.221.0/24 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
149.223.0.0/16 TRW Automotive (GB)
194.169.35.0/24 AgustaWestland Ltd (GB)
167.26.158.0/24 CIBC World Markets (GB)
159.197.13.0/24 NATS (GB)
62.172.0.0/16 BT Public Internet Service (GB)
212.162.230.0/24 Royal Bank of Scotland plc (GB)
216.222.222.0/24 Smith and Nephew - Endoscopy (GB)
193.102.37.0/24 Softlab GmbH, Muenchen (GB)
194.102.0.0/19 British Telecommunications PLC (GB)
193.32.39.0/24 Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd (GB)
192.156.169.0/24 Syntellect Inc. (GB)
171.30.128.0/17 Global Crossing VHSDR service (GB)
132.153.248.0/24 Atomic Weapons Establishment (GB)
194.34.209.0/24 The Statistics Board (GB)
193.36.253.0/24 Allen and Overy LLP (GB)
195.95.131.0/24 NCC Services Ltd (GB)
152.134.0.0/16 SIX CONTINENTS LIMITED (GB)
61.28.219.0/24 Servcorp (GB)
194.34.223.0/24 Allianz Insurance plc (GB)
167.26.159.0/24 CIBC World Markets (GB)
193.39.141.0/24 AWE PLC (GB)

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37 Responses to UK traffic diverted through Ukraine

  1. laughing says:

    Obviously the real target was Fruit of the Loom

  2. […] have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  3. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  4. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  5. […] have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  6. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  7. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  8. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  9. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  10. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  11. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  12. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  13. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  14. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  15. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  16. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  17. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  18. Robert Chin says:

    Has anyone checked this traffic for evidence of FREAK attacks?

  19. […] La société Dyn a détecté cette redirection anormale et indique que dans les clients concernés on trouve AWE (Atomic Weapons Establishment) qui est l’entité qui fabrique les armes nucléaires pour le programme de dissuasion britannique… Parmi les 167 clients ont trouve des grosses entreprise dont Lockheed Martin qui a un profil similaire. […]

  20. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning […]

  21. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  22. […] davvero “errore innocente”? I dettagli, per tutti gli addetti ai lavori, sono spiegati sul sito di Dyn, i ricercatori che hanno scoperto il […]

  23. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  24. […] I have to believe this was an innocent mistake by Vega,” said Dyn’s Doug Madory, who first discovered the redirection, “but it’s concerning nonetheless.” This phenomenon is known as “route […]

  25. […] МOСКВA, 15 мaр – РИA Нoвoсти. Кoнфидeнциaльныe дaнныe с   приблизитeльнo дeсятки крупныx кoмпaний, между которых британский производитель ядерного оружия   — корпорации Atomic Weapons Establishment и   североамериканская корпорация Lockheed Martin, имели возможность быть скомпроментированы из-вслед того, что веб-движение British Telecom был нечаянно перенаправлен через   Украину, сообщает фирма Dyn. […]

  26. […] => UK traffic diverted through Ukraine. 13/03/2015. «On the heels of the BGP leak yesterday that briefly impaired Google services around the world, comes another routing incident that impacted some other important Internet services (…).» Source : research.dyn.com/2015/03/uk-traffic-diverted-ukraine/ […]

  27. […] Конфиденциальные данные из приблизительно десятка крупных компаний, среди которых британский производитель ядерного оружия — корпорации Atomic Weapons Establishment и американская корпорация Lockheed Martin, могли быть скомпрометированы из-за того, что веб-трафик British Telecom был случайно перенаправлен через Украину, сообщает компания Dyn. […]

  28. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  29. […] helicopter company AgustaWestland, and the UK Department for Environment, according to a blog post published Friday by researchers from Dyn, a firm that helps companies monitor and control their online […]

  30. […] uppgifter inom specialpress har Internettrafik mellan militära installationer i USA och Storbritannien under fem dagar i […]

  31. […] example of such an attack took place in March 2015, when Internet traffic for 167 important British Telecom customers, including a UK defense […]

  32. […] example of such an attack took place in March 2015, when Internet traffic for 167 important British Telecom customers, including a UK defense […]

  33. […] example of such an attack took place in March 2015, when Internet traffic for 167 important British Telecom customers, including a UK defense […]

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